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Abstract: Whilst most of the literature focusing on the Korean peninsula has concentrated on 
how to achieve unification through confidence-building measures, dialogues, negotiation and 
diplomacy, little attention has been paid to how a unified Korean identity, a core component of 
any potential reunification scheme could develop and be sustained. The paper addresses this gap 
by: (1) defining what national identity is, and how Korean identities have been formed, (2) 
outlining how both South and North Korea have understood and used the concept of national 
identity, (3) suggesting possible grounds on which the two Koreas could build a new, common 
national identity.  
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Highlights: 
• National identity concept exists in both North and South Korea and the concept is 
managed mostly by the elite powers in both countries. 
• Both Koreas base their national identity on similar concepts (namely history, 
ethnocentrism and culture). 
• Both countries affected by globalisation and struggling to maintain a consistent national 
identity over the years. 
• Both Koreas have an uneasy relationship with anything ‘external’ to their homogeneous 
group and loss of homogeneity seen as a threat by both 
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Introduction 
 
 While most of the literature focusing on the Korean peninsula has concentrated on how to 
achieve unification, and has thus extrapolated on confidence-building measures, dialogues, 
negotiation rounds, diplomatic openings as well as practical discussions on infrastructure, 
taxation and property rights, the nature of the Korean tensions has detracted researchers from 
advancing models of sustained unification. The Korean peninsula is widely known for remaining 
one of the only few parts of the world where remnants of the Cold War are still preventing 
peaceful coexistence. As a result of the partition of Korea after World War Two both Koreas 
have presented themselves as being the only legitimate entity having the “right to define and 
govern citizens of its counterparts as its own political subjects” (Park and Chang, 2005). Some 
have argued that the political vacuum that has been left after the Japanese occupation has led 
both Koreas to develop ‘dualistic and antagonistic’ identities (Bleiker, 2001). 
 
 Igniting a new strand of intellectual enquiry and research that assumes reunification as a 
positive development and that deals with forward policies, thus bypassing current debates that 
present only bleak prospects for the peninsula and that argues about the prevalence of costs and 
dangers when it comes to a potential reunification, the project focuses on three factors that will 
need to be considered in order for a potential Korean unification to be successful. Those factors, 
reconciliation, mutual trust and common identity are dependent from one another: in order for an 
eventual unification to be sustainable, it is not enough to state that both Koreas must be unified 
under one system. Indeed, this would assume a top-down approach, meaning that governmental 
structures, legal systems, economic policies as well as other components of a country would be 
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remoulded in order to accommodate both North and South Koreans. However, unification must 
address the emotional and personal component of what a country is made of: individuals. As 
such, it is insufficient to assume that people will naturally develop a sense of unity and belonging 
to a reunified Korea, as such processes are extremely complex. In essence, a Korean 
reunification will necessarily lead to the construction of a new nation, and as such of a new 
national identity: this is, for all purpose, nation-building. In Bloom’s words, nation-building 
means “both the formation and establishment of the new state itself as a political entity, and the 
process of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement and a sense of national 
identity among the people” (1990).  In order to assess how a new Korean national identity could 
be created, the research will progress in three steps: (1) Defining what national identity is, and 
how Korean identities have been formed, (2) Outlining how both South and North Korea have 
understood and used the concept of national identity, (3) Find possible grounds on which the two 
Koreas could build a new, common national identity.  
 
 It is hypothesized that each country understands national identity differently, with North 
Korea sponsoring a top-down approach in which being North Korean is generally directly by the 
regime, and which allows little room for any development at the individual level. For South 
Korea, it is hypothesized that national identity was also mostly created under a top-down 
approach during the post-war period, but that after the 1980s and economic development, newer 
generations have a more fluid and sometimes confused understanding of their own national 
identity. Emphasis will also be put on new immigration patterns to South Korea that have started 
to redefine South Korean understanding of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘ethnocentrism’.  
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Defining National Identity 
 
 The concept of a national identity, or a form of national consciousness, predates by far 
our general understanding of the nation-state system being born out of European wars and 
resulting in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, Smith traces the beginnings of national 
consciousness to the war between the Scots, French and English, with the caveat that such 
movements were not secular ones. Essentially, it is not “until the American and French 
Revolutions that nationalism appears as a ‘fully-fledged secular ideology’” (Smith, 1992). 
National identity is therefore the resulting feeling associated with the concept of a nation which 
Smith comprehensively defines as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy  and  
common  legal  rights  and  duties  for  all  members” (1991). A national identity gives people a 
sense of belonging and a way to relate to one another through a heightened ‘awareness of 
affiliation’ (Keane, 1993) but differs from a state’s identity: while being born out of similar 
factors such as people, geography, religion and customs, a state is clearly different because it 
incorporates governing structures through regimes (Choi, 2010). Thus there appears to be, 
according to Jones and Smith, two largely different yet related concepts to form a national 
identity: on the one hand, ascriptive qualities such as ethnicity and kinship provide a more 
organic and biological grounding in one’s relationship to a group, while on the other hand a 
voluntaristic set of qualities such as civic roles and duties determines one’s place within a polity 
(2001). The relationship between the ethnic and civic components of a nation is far from being 
straightforward, as there appears to be an inherent tension between the two, especially when 
considering that the examples of ‘nation-state’ that would consist of only one ascriptive group (a 
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homogeneous ethnic group for example) evolving within the realms of the state as defined 
classically in International Relations as being composed of a fixed population, fixed border, a 
government and an ability to enter into relations with other state is all but non-existent 
nowadays: Japan, Israel and the Koreas are often referred to a near nation-states in that sense, 
largely because of their homogenously-perceived population, while many European states and 
the United States, obviously, are disqualified as nation-states because of their pluri-ethnic 
backgrounds. In essence, though it is generally accepted that “national identity is part of one 
category of collective identities, namely those with a territorial reference” (Kohli, 2000). There 
are many debates in the literature about whether a national identity is more of a political unit or a 
rather ascriptive one, and especially how national identity is projected, taught, reinforced, and 
recognizable. Other debates also pertain to how national identity fluctuates: this is important as it 
leads to questions on whether a national identity can be defined and managed, and especially on 
whether a particular national identity is considered at risk if it is being changed. Such discussions 
also lead to important normative questions on whether or not national identities can, and should 
be protected, or whether they should evolve and mirror evolution seen in societies and states.  
 
 The consensus is that national identity lies first and foremost within people of a specific 
nation, regardless of whether the concept is sustained from the people up to the state structure as 
a bottom-up approach, or whether it is defined and managed by a regime and regulating people 
as a top-down process. Because national identity can be understood as being a group identity 
according to Schlesinger’s work (1991), values, myths, traditions and collective memories shared 
and perpetuated by one people allow for a common sense of unity to be developed and 
maintained. The concept of place is noted as especially important by Jacobi and Stokols, as place 
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can be seen as a way for individuals to be bound together, but also as enabling groups to sustain 
a common identity over long periods of time, hence creating ‘historical traditions’ (1983). 
National identity can also be expressed through tangible means such as banknotes, hymns, 
stamps and foods, though Unwin and Hewitt note in their work on Eastern European currency 
design post-Soviet Union the paucity of research in that particular domain when compared to the 
amount of knowledge gathered by geographers when connecting people and places (2001). 
Eventually, most national identities are carried through ‘regulated’ knowledge transmission and 
acquisition processes such as education (Choi, 2011), with schooling systems providing a top-
down approach through which nationhood can be fostered by a specific government (Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1990)̉. With educational systems providing the matrix for national identity to 
develop, especially by focusing on historical and civic elements that should be acquired while 
growing up, the concept of pride is largely seen as being one of the most recognizable 
manifestations of national identity. With national pride being defined as “the positive affect that 
the public feels toward their country as a result of their national identity” (Smith et al., 1998), 
Chung and Choe suggest that national pride can be found in a variety of mediums such as 
science, economy, or the arts, with national pride in sports being especially important for 
relatively small countries (2008).  
 
 While factors such as historical events, places, religions, and national heroes might 
appear perennial, a multitude of factors from war to economic development can have a 
significant impact on national identity as well. As such, national identity should also be 
understood as an evolving concept functioning in a similar fashion to how one’s individual 
identity is constructed and Erikson’s proposition that individual identity is being constantly 
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renegotiated as a response to one’s environment is a useful parallel to how a national identity 
might be fluctuating (1956). Because national identity is connected to most aspects of a group 
through their history, places, governmental structures and sense of pride, just about every 
country would be interesting in maintaining a strong feeling of national identity in order to both 
foster unity from within as well as communicating this unity to outsiders that might be seen as a 
threat, or what Triandafyllidou calls a ‘significant other’(1998). A ‘significant other’ allows for 
one group to develop its own identity in relation to, as well as by differentiating itself from 
another group that could be “a neighbouring group which shares a set of cultural traditions 
and/or historical experiences while the nation is perceived as a significant other because it 
threatens the sense of distinctiveness and uniqueness of the latter,” a concept extremely salient in 
the context of the two Koreas (Triandafyllidou, 1998). From then on, contenting national 
identities can either manage or fail to coexist: Guetzkow’s outlook allows for identities to, in 
theory at least,  manage a rather peaceful coexistence if they are differentiated enough to each be 
able to fulfil a specific need (1955) but Kwon’s more realistic (and pessimistic) proposition 
suggests that the need to strengthen one’s national identity more often than not leads to 
competition, contention and conflict between countries (2011b).  
 
Understanding Korean identity 
 
 The concept of a Korean identity differs from the general understanding of what a 
national identity is, mostly because of the fact that the Korean nation as a group has been split in 
two since the end of World War Two. As a result, forces highlighted above and known to 
influence the formation of a group identity and therefore of a national identity such as 
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government structures, education, relation to territory and especially the links one group 
entertains with its own history are different for North and South Koreans, thus leading to two 
separate identities emanating from a single overarching Korean identity largely definite in terms 
of one unique race. Hence, Korean identity for both groups has been associated with ethnic 
nationalism in some cases, but highlighted as not being sufficient-enough to really understand 
the complexity that exists in each group, and especially how the two groups understand each 
other as well (Shin and Burke, 2008). North and South Koreans therefore clearly exhibit separate 
traits such as conflicting identities, dissonance, opposition, and security-derived expression of 
self, all compounded by the legal question of which group represents the ‘true’ and ‘original’ 
Korean population. Yet, despite those differences, Koreans as people also are a homogeneous 
group: this blood-based homogeneity sometimes brings both identities together toward the will to 
reunify.  
 
 Park and Chang provide a clear explanation of the dilemma that lies at the core of North 
and South Korean people, by suggesting that “the discrepancy between a single ethnic identity 
and the reality of political divides produces dissonance in identity maintenance” (2005). What is 
more difficult to assess in the literature, however, is whether a single Korean identity, born out of 
centuries of traditions and consolidated during the Japanese occupation has now been stretched 
in two different and opposing directions because of the ideological and political models imposed 
by the DPRK leadership on the one hand, and successive South Korean presidencies on the other 
hand, or whether conflicting identities have been developed in both Koreas in order to compete 
against one another. While it is generally assumed that North Korea’s national identity is 
monolithic because of the nature of the regime and the lack of political freedom, it is 
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questionable whether there also exists only one South Korean national identity. In this regard, 
Suh suggests that South Koreans are divided in regards to understanding how their relationship 
with the United States oscillates between alliance and dependency, and this in turn affects their 
own national identity (2004). What has been clearly delineated in the literature, however, is how 
both Koreas appear to have built their identities on what Bleiker calls ‘negative terms’ (2001),  
essentially because both Pyongyang and Seoul have developed political systems that claim they 
represent (short of being actually implemented, but at least rhetorically) the entirety of the 
Korean peninsula, as well as the entirety of the Korean people. Discrete citizenships (one Korean 
being a South Korean citizen cannot also be a North Korean citizen and vice-versa) means that 
Korean identities appear to have become mutually-exclusive, mostly because of security 
concerns and because of the relationship both Koreas have developed with the United States.  
This dual national identity is expressed in the most obvious way by the need to use different 
names when referring to the two Koreas, with Paik suggesting that “national identity for a 
contemporary Korean is at the very least double, namely as a member of the Korean nation and a 
citizen of either of the divided states” (2000).  The concept of one Korean nation is by far one of 
the most important unifying characteristics for both Koreas apart from pre-division history, and a 
“strong, almost mythical vision of homogeneity permeates both parts of Korea (Bleiker, 2001). 
The simple fact the Korean people have remained an almost homogeneous ethnic group over the 
years has led both countries to argue that the Korean partition has been an unnatural event that 
has severed the nation in two: there is an ever-present notion that eventually, Korean people 
should become one again and in the meantime, maintaining ethnic purity is taking a rather 
important position in North Korea but to some extent in South Korea as well.  
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Characteristics of South and North Korean National Identities: What we Know. 
 
 Both South Korean and North Korean identities have been studied in the past, though 
there is no encompassing work that has been able to clearly map out each identity’s boundaries 
and their evolution over time. Consulting a wider body of literature enables a consolidated vision 
of what each national identity is, what reinforces it, and surprisingly how similar some major 
components are, despite a general understanding of antagonistically-constructed characters.  
 
 With the South Korean state legally established in 1948, most national identity 
characteristics first appeared through a political construction and a quest for legitimacy that was 
especially consolidated under the Park Chung Hee regime, and which was largely focused on 
“the formation of anti-communist consciousness” (Choi, 2011), with North Korea being 
“undoubtedly an important element in South Korea’s concept of national identity” (Shin and 
Burke, 2008). The Korean case is therefore more typical than not, with one national identity 
being strengthened because of a significant contending identity hence echoing Triandafyllidou’s 
idea of a significant other. State-designed legislations were also put in place in order to 
consolidate a national identity by excluding the possibility of any sympathy toward North Korea, 
and even though the past two decades have shown less antagonizing policies toward Pyongyang 
and especially because of protesters in 1987 seeking more freedom and leniency from the 
government, Seoul still employs National Security Law principles that restrict freedom to 
politically support the North (Bleiker, 2001). South Korean political life is far from being a 
unanimous entity: Kim Dae Jong’s Sunshine Policy that was initiated during the 1990s led to 
Seoul becoming polarised and divided on ways to engage North Korea, with Choi’s research 
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showing that “Seoul’s engagement policy initiated a politics of identity reformation between 
Sunshine’s proponents and opponents”(2010). The development of a civil society in South Korea 
has been noted as a central element in the redefinition of both South Korean politics and South 
Korean national identities (Shin and Burke, 2008): as a result of South Korea’s unprecedented 
economic and political liberalisation, globalisation has swept the country and has affected many 
aspects of the society, leading to question which direction the country is taking, and how its 
national identity is being shaped. New politics have been put in place to start to regulate 
immigration, a very new phenomenon for South Korea as the country had been an ‘exporter’ of 
human capital, but never a destination of choice for immigrants, especially those from less 
developed South Asian countries. Korean politicians have therefore spent time devising policies 
such as the Korean Overseas Act which would regulate overseas ethnic Koreans’ rights vis-à-vis 
their homeland and aim to strengthen the Korean ethnic nation (Park and Chang, 2005), while at 
the same time having to address concerns of their homogeneous population becoming ‘diluted’ 
because of more frequent mixed marriages, resulting in the state having “more difficulties trying 
to impose its ethnocentric interpretation of nationhood upon its citizens” (Chung and Choe, 
2008). It has been difficult to accurately analyse the effects that domestic policies and outside 
forces such as globalisation have had on the South Korean population, and there does not appear 
to be a clear and delineated national identity within the country. Analyses based on the 2003 
Korean General Social Survey have shown two extremely interesting trends, however: South 
Korea appears to be a low-trust society, with more than half of the population not trusting people 
in position of power, both at the national and local level (Chung and Choe, 2008), and the 
population seems to be still very hopeful for Korean unification to take place, at some point, 
which would entail a stronger Korean nation less influenced by foreign countries (Park and 
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Chang, 2005). These two tendencies lead to questions regarding how a national inclusive identity 
could be fostered within the South Korean society, as a top-down approach might not be 
necessarily accepted by a population that is more and more accustomed to freedom and critical 
thinking brought about by democratisation and globalisation.  
 
 North Korea’s development of its own national identity has not been entirely different 
from South Korea’s journey. The establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
was based on socialist identities bolstered by the Soviet Union, and in direct opposition to how 
South Korea developed its political and economic system as well, but with a difference: 
according to Kwon, South Korea focused on gungmin, or ‘nation’ whereas North Korea focused 
on inmin or ‘people’, with both countries’ population belonging to the same minjok, or ‘ethnic 
nation’ (2011a), though the term minjok has been largely used to describe Koreans who adhered 
to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s ideological construction, hence minimizing the number of 
South Korean people who could be counted as being part of minjok (Lee, 2010). A top-down 
system delineated what the North Korean national identity was by concentrating only on Kim Il 
Sung and its persona and history, therefore reducing the population to being his own inmin  
(Kwon, 2011b) while at the same time conducting ‘myth-cleaning’ by eradicating from school 
curricula and general propaganda historical figures that predated the Korean partition, and which 
could therefore had been building blocks for both South and North Korean identities (Lee, 2010). 
The fall of communist ideologies in many parts of the world including the Soviet Union’s 
collapse led the North Korean elite to strengthen some of its national symbols in order to create a 
new set of myths for its people, and the education system was used as an integral part of the 
identity reinforcement process. Schools had already been used since the late 1960s to promote 
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the Great Leader’s activities during and after the Japanese occupation (Lee, 2010) but recent 
studies on North Korean schooling give impressive numbers: indeed by the time a student 
reaches university, about 40 percent of subjects taught are exclusively about political education 
(Byman and Lind, 2010). Additionally, a large part of North Korean national identity is based on 
the politics of exclusion and dichotomy especially targeted at Japan and then at the United States. 
Indeed, Lee’s comprehensive studies of North Korean textbooks has shown that North Korea 
depicts Japanese especially in past historical contexts, while Americans are represented as an 
ever-present and contemporary threat (2010), with Kim suggesting that “representation of the 
Japanese...are twice as numerous as depictions of American” (1990a). Those depictions are also 
often accompanied by derogatory statements that often involve racial commentaries, hence 
hinting at North Korean national identity as being based on racial tendencies as well as 
xenophobia (Byman and Lind, 2010).  
 
National Identity: How Close Apart are the two Koreas? 
 
 Assuming that the two Koreas will at one point in time be reunited, the construction of a 
national identity will be an imperative for any unified society to survive. In order to do so, 
communication and the ability that both Korean groups will have when they relate to one another 
are essential characteristics that will need to be developed and fostered. In order to reach this 
stage, the nature of both South and North Korean identities should be examined in order to 
understand how they each define themselves, and also how they define each other. Because 
media has been understood as being an important political actor in both South and North Korean 
contexts, relaying elite positions as well as shifting political opinion (Shin and Burke, 2008), an 
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analysis of both South Korean and North Korea media in relation to national identity over time 
could provide salient answers in trying to understand: 
 
Q1: If the concept of national identity exists in both South Korea and North Korea?  
H1: One would expect the term ‘national identity’ to be identifiable in a number of news 
articles, thus confirming that ‘national identity’ is a concept that is regularly presented, 
discussed and to some extent analysed in both North and South Korean news outlets, 
given that previous research presented above has identified the concept in a number of 
contexts already.  
 
Q2: If such concept exists, how different is it for both Koreas? 
H2: One would expect the concepts to differ from one another, mostly because the two 
Koreas have been previously identified in the literature as ‘significant others’ and 
‘enemies’, and because the vastly different domestic contexts and the lack of substantive 
interactions between the two Koreas would most likely mean that concepts have evolved 
differently. One would especially expect the concept to be more challenged and 
compromised within the South Korean context given Seoul’s evolution and  bouts with 
globalisation. 
 
Q3: How is the concept formed and managed, and sustained? 
H3: One would expect to find that the context of national identity is largely present in 
elite-driven political contexts as well as via discussions regarding education, as those 
factors have previously been identified in both North Korea and South Korean contexts. 
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Q4: How stable are the identities over time? 
H4: One would expect to find that identities on the Korean peninsula are still largely 
informed by the security context, and that national identities could potential relax and 
appear as more compatible and less mutually-exclusive in times of ‘relative’ peace and 
cooperation between the two Koreas whereas the concept might be seen as more 
divergent and incompatible in times of ‘relative’ security strain.  
 
In order to answer those initial questions, a content analysis of both North Korean and South 
Koreans news was conducted.  
 
Table 1. Newspaper List and Article Representation 
 
South Korea North Korea 
Korea Times (41%) Korea Central News Agency (83%) 
Korea Herald (41%) Pyongyang Times (14%) 
Choson Ilbo (18%) Rodong Sinmun (3%) 
 
The South Korean news coverage consisted of a more conservative news outlet (Choson 
Ilbo) and a more liberal stance provided with the Korea Times and Korea Herald. The North 
Korean news coverage was largely based on the KCNA’s articles and Pyongyang Times. It is 
recognised that some discussion could not be necessarily captured as the study was conducted 
with English materials. However, the strict coding treatment applied here provides for a robust 
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analysis. Each news outlets was searched for articles containing ‘national identity’, ‘ethnic 
identity’ and ‘Korean identity’, yielding more than 2,065 articles. After articles irrelevant or 
duplicated were removed, 104 articles were selected and coded for North Korea, whereas 271 
articles were selected and coded for South Korea. After a content analysis, each article was 
tagged as belonging to two general categories: 
 
 
1(a) South Korean categories 
 
 
1(b) North Korean categories 
Business 
 
South Korean companies, economic 
impact, market and trade liberalization 
Business Domestic production, wages 
Culture 
Cultural events in South Korea and 
Korean cultural events abroad, historical 
cultural symbols, arts, pop culture 
Culture 
Cultural events in North Korea and 
Korean cultural events abroad, historical 
cultural symbols, arts, classical music, 
folk culture 
 
Education 
 
Ministerial decisions, schooling and its 
effects, young people, learning, Korean 
language abroad 
 
Education Language, schooling 
People 
 
Ethnic Koreans overseas, immigrants to 
South Korea, Korean citizens 
 
People Ethnic Koreans overseas, North Korean citizens 
Politics 
 
Domestic political groups, government 
policies, president and government 
actions 
 
Politics Kim family 
Security 
 
Military, inter-Korean relations 
 
Japan Past historical relationship, war crimes 
Sports 
 
Olympic games, domestic and overseas 
sporting events 
 
Nation Juche ideology, Workers’ Party. 
North 
Korea 
 
North Korean leadership, North Korean 
society 
 
South 
Korea 
South Korea-United States relationship, 
South Korean society 
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Charts 1a and 2b show the general breakdown of articles according to 8 general categories 
relevant articles were found to belong to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Most of the articles that discussed the concept of national identity did so in relation to 
‘Culture’ predominantly, with a large number of articles discussing various cultural initiatives 
related to arts, music, food, and writing which were supporting a traditional understanding of 
Korean identity through arts and crafts. The ‘Politics’ category was also very largely represented, 
with most of the articles focusing on internal political divisions between the Conservatives and 
the Liberals, with a strong emphasis on whether pursing a ‘Northern’ policy along the lines of 
Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy compromises a national identity. South Korean news also 
largely focused on ‘People’, essentially talking about the overseas Korean community, as well as 
challenges faced by South Korea in accommodating foreigners and immigrants. The ‘Education’ 
category was also of concern, with discussion regarding the role of history in curriculum as well 
as the predominance of English being seen as damaging to the national identity. ‘North Korea’ 
was also notably discussed, especially in relation to reunification efforts, and conversely as a 
threat to South Korea. Other lesser categories included ‘Security’, ‘Sport’ and ‘Business’, 
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focusing mostly on how South Korea’s national identity can be boosted through 
accomplishments through sports and flagship brands.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
A large amount of articles focused on the concept of ‘Nation’, with many repetitive and 
verbatim articles on how Juche should be preserved. ‘Culture’ was also very prominent, with 
themes extremely similar to those present in South Korea, namely the protection of a genuine 
Korean identity that is based on traditions, writings, music and arts. Japan was treated 
extensively in the ‘People’ category, with a number of articles talking about overseas Korean 
population in Japan and their link with the ‘homeland’. South Korea was also discussed, 
especially to deplore its loss of national identity due to international interference. The ‘Politics’ 
category was largely focusing on the Kim rulers and their representation around the country, and 
could be associated closely with the ‘Nation’ category. ‘Business’, ‘Education’ and ‘Japan’ 
formed a very small amount of articles.  
  
20 
 
In order to understand how the various issues have been represented over time, the data was also 
arranged as time-series with Charts 2a and 2b showing the trend evolution.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2a and 2b clearly shows that ‘Culture’ is an issue that has been treated by both 
South and North Korea on almost a yearly basis when talking about national identity. It might 
therefore provide one of the ‘connecting’ points that could be useful to foster a common identity 
eventually. The issue of ‘Politics’ for South Korea and ‘Nation’ for North Korea are also 
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consistently present across the years, with ‘North Korea’ and ‘South Korea’ also represented 
consistently across the years as well. There are a number of issues that appear to be presented on 
each graph mostly for circumstantial reasons: ‘Sport’ is especially flaring in 2002 for South 
Korea, the year Seoul and Tokyo hosted the World Cup. ‘Security’ also appears in 2007, 2008 
and 2011 for South Korea, at times of confrontation and contention with North Korea.  
 
Table 2. Subcategories, per Country 
 
South Korea North Korea 
Culture 86 (32%) Nation 44 (42%) 
People 50 (18%) Culture 19 (18%) 
Politics 48 (18%) People 12 (12%) 
North Korea 34 (13%) South Korea 11 (11%) 
Education 24 (9%) Politics 9 (9%) 
Business 13 (5%) Education 4 (4%) 
Sport 9 (3%) Japan 3 (3%) 
Security 7 (3%) Business 2 (2%) 
 
 Table 2 present Subcategories per country. For South Korea, ‘Culture’, ‘People’, 
‘Politics’ and ‘North Korea’ represent rather large amount of articles compared to the four other 
categories, and represent 81% of the total amount of data. For North Korea, ‘Nation’, ‘Culture’, 
‘People’ and ‘South Korea’ also represent the largest amount of articles compared to the four 
other categories, adding up to 83% of all the data. South Korea’s ‘Politics’ category is akin to 
22 
 
North Korea’s ‘Nation’ given the North Korean regime, so for both North and South three 
categories (‘Culture’, ‘People’, and ‘Politics’/’Nations’) are the most represented, with the 
significant other ‘North Korea’ and ‘South Korea’ making the 4th largest category. Each of these 
categories was further investigated and coded according to Tendencies.  
 
 
3(a) South Korean Tendencies 
 
 
3(b) North Korean Tendencies 
The Past 
 
Cultural artefacts, national holidays, 
pre-1945 history 
 
The Past Cultural artefacts, national holidays, pre-1945 history 
Japan 
 
World War II, colonial reminders, 
rewriting of history 
 
Japan 
World War II, colonial reminders, 
rewriting of history 
 
Factors 
Affecting 
Identity 
Domestic political decision, 
nationalism and globalisation 
Factors 
Affecting 
Identity 
Bourgeoisie and imperialism 
Overseas 
Korean 
 
Diasporas, education, Korean 
adoptees, Korean-Americans 
 
Overseas 
Korean Koreans in Japan 
Group 
Divergence 
 
Ruling party versus opposition, 
engagement policies toward North 
Korea 
 
Juche Preserving national identity, patriotism, Kim family 
Loss of National 
Identity 
 
Identity and economics, history 
textbooks 
 
Preserving 
Identity 
Culture, music, literature, arts, 
education and patriotism 
Multiculturalism 
 
Naturalized Korean citizens, 
ethnicity, foreign brides 
 
Homogeneity 5,000-year history, Korean blood 
  Reunification 
 
Patriotism, unity through blood 
 
  Anti-US 
 
Fighting to keep Juche alive 
 
  Anti-Imperialism 
 
National self-respect 
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Results for both South Korea and North Korea are presented in Charts 3a and 3b.  
 
Chart 3a. South Korean Themes, by tendencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culture: most of the articles related to culture focused on how Korean cultural elements are 
guarantors of a specific Korean national identity, and should be used to foster such identity. As a 
counterpart group, a  large number of articles focusses on how losing cultural traditions such as 
cooking, wearing traditional dress or overseas Koreans no longer speaking Korean language 
would amount to endangering Korean identity and leading to its loss. The effects of 
globalisation, mainly how South Korea had to content with new forces such as migrants as well 
as a larger Korean diaspora group lead to debates within political parties about what solution, if 
any, could be found to maintain a discrete Korean identity through culture. Lastly, the weight of 
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the past as well as Korean’s difficult history with Japan also created a third stream of articles, 
with debate regarding how preserving culture in light of adversity would make a strong Korean 
nation. 
People: while Japan keeps on being an important presence within the South Korean news when 
it comes to how Korean people were divided by their neighbour’s imperialistic actions in the 
past, most of the discussion within the ‘People’ category is centred on how multiculturalism 
within South Korea is challenging and changing national identity. This is accentuated by a sense 
of pull and push when it comes to the overseas Korean population, with a focus on actions 
helping to foster a sense of Korean identity abroad by promoting culture and educational links, 
but also using new medium such as popular culture.  
Politics: a very large part of the articles focusses on political group divergence over what 
policies to develop and actions to take in order to counterbalance changes seen within the South 
Korean society. The ‘Politics’ category provides very factionalized results, and shows very 
clearly that the Korean political class is clearly at odd with how fast South Korea is changing and 
how national identity is being affected by such changes. There is no discussion, however, of 
what essentially constitutes a national identity, with the concept being de-facto used without 
much in-depth analysis, thus showing that there has been little space within Korean politics to 
debate of such topic, mostly because of the rapidity of changes within the society necessitating 
rapid actions.  
North Korea: traditional concerns regarding how to deal with the significant other are clearly 
related within this category, with many articles focusing on group divergence, namely 
conservative and more liberal forces arguing on how to engage Pyongyang. The constant is that 
engaging is seen as a potential weakening of a South Korean national identity, mostly because of 
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North Korean untrustworthy behaviour, but a large number of articles also argues for considering 
reconciliation. Koreans exiled in Japan makes up for a large part of the articles as well along 
with how to deal with Korean defectors, thus providing yet another overseas group that South 
Korea appears unsure of how to deal or contend with.  
 
Chart 3b. North Korean Themes, by Tendencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nation: more than half of the content regarding nation is linked with Juche ideology, and 
especially how elements of the Juche ideology form the basis of a national identity. Those 
elements are not clearly explained, but are linked to concepts such as socialism and revolution.  
The idea of a homogeneous nation also appears to support the concept of national identity, while 
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the rest of the articles focusses on elements that are threatening to the concept of national identity 
such as imperialism, American policy and the role of Japan within the Korean division. 
Culture: Preserving national identity through cultural heritage and events is largely represented, 
and a wealth of articles focusses on the Kim family’s support of the arts and contact with artists, 
and ministries and institutions supporting arts, especially musical performances, to embody 
Korean national identity. Imperialist and foreign currents also appear to undermine such as 
identity, with Juche policies being represented in the arts, and therefore constituting a valuable 
support to the presentation of a Korean national identity.  
People: The overseas Korean population in Japan is seen as a prime example of a fight for the 
preservation of a genuine Korean identity with their attempt to not be completely assimilated 
within the Japanese society, but the articles also focus on specific historical cases that perpetuate 
the ideas that Japan attempted to destroy Korean identity long time ago by restricting Korean’s 
choice of names, for example.  
South Korea: South Korea’s politicians, and especially those who proclaims hard-line policies 
against North Korea appear to be endangering North Korea’s identity, but national reunification 
is an important aspect of this category as well, with a clear impetus within North Korea to 
consider that a national identity must focus on Korean-ness, and therefore must exclude actors 
such as the United States or Japan. 
 
Anatomy of a Korean National Identity 
 
 Despite research showing that both North and South Korea appear to have developed 
different national identities mostly because of their diverging environments, evolution, and 
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interactions with the world, the current analysis finds surprising results: both Koreas base their 
national identity on similar concepts (namely history, ethnocentrism and culture), and both 
Koreas have an uneasy relationship with anything ‘external’ to their homogeneous group (the 
United States is an obvious element of distress for North Korea, but is also destabilising and 
contentious within the South Korean society). Despite the fact that both Koreas treat each other 
as ‘significant other’ and understand that they are each other’s ‘security concerns’, most of the 
discussions and information emanating from both countries do not question the fact that 
reunification should happen, which also confirms Shin and Burke’s findings that “the North is 
therefore a ‘Korean’ issue, inseparable from inter-Koreans relations” (2008). The concept of 
reunification is used, however, in both North and South Korean political contexts to advance 
political groups (or maintain the elite’s hold on power in the case of North Korea).  
 
 The South Korean discussion of North Korea activities and North Korea identity is rather 
limited, and stems from characteristics that have already been defined in the literature, namely 
the fact that the South Korean government has not encouraged much analysis and study of its 
Northern counterpart apart from right-wing analysis in the 1970s (Lee, 2010). South Korea also 
focuses on concepts that are associated with North Korea, such as the security conundrum, but 
equally important is the North Korean overseas population in Japan and the North Korean 
defectors. The importance of ‘Political Group Divergence’ within South Korea reinforces the 
notion that South Korean politics are split between at least two political factions, basically along 
the classic ‘dove-hawk’ decision-making pattern. North Korea is no longer considered and 
depicted in a demonized way, however, which is a statement that is still consistent with Jager’s  
mid-1990s findings about how American imperialism and the relationship between the United 
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States and the South Korean government was more of a contention when trying to achieve 
reunification than Pyongyang itself (Jager, 1996). Instead, South Korea is clearly concerned with 
the question of homogeneity, and how to manage the effect of globalisation and the perceived 
loss of national identity and true Korean characteristics because of immigration and emigration 
patterns. Concerning patterns of ethnocentrism are also discussed in the articles, with immigrants 
to South Korea noting the difficulty they face becoming part of the Korean society, and being 
treated as lesser citizens. Associated with how North Korea is also portrayed, through defectors’ 
struggle mainly, this leads to questions regarding how inclusive South Korean people could be 
when considering ‘others’, given their already marked hierarchical understanding of races and 
non-Korean people.  The same concerns can also be applied to North Korea: it is known from 
previous studies on textbooks that Pyongyang tends to portray South Koreas either as political 
elite enemies, or as peasants (Lee, 2010). The evidence found in the news article seem to confirm 
this trend, as well as reinforce the fact that North Korea also sees South Korean population and 
therefore identity as being depraved, mostly because of foreign ideals being implemented, as 
well as because of a loss of homogeneity due to mix-marriages, or the concept of ‘contamination 
by association’ as highlighted by Byman and Lind (2010). When considering both South Korean 
and North Korean tendencies to consider outside influence as compromising to their own 
identity, it might be reasonable to assume that both countries might be unwilling to see their 
civic identity move away from their baseline to converge somewhere in the middle. 
Homogeneity and the concept of one Korean race and history, however, means that ethnic 
identity is a bond that cannot be broken between the two Koreas. The fact that South Korea has 
to now accommodate a number of foreigners appear to also be counterbalanced by the fact that 
Seoul is working on creating and maintaining a Korean national identity outside of its own 
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borders focusing on overseas Koreans and attempting to instil more ‘Korean-ess’ in them 
through arts, culture and educational exchanges.   
 
 The two Koreas’ national identities converge on a large number of ways, however. First, 
there is little discussion in South Korea, and not much at all, for more obvious leadership control 
reason in North Korea, about how national identity is determined. It appears to be a process that 
is directed, in both cases, by government structures, and there is a dominance of political actors 
associated with the concept of national identity. Nation-building is therefore a political elite 
concern, and both Koreas have used education as a means to consolidate both the civic and 
ethnic aspect of national identity. Both countries have also been affected by globalisation and 
outside influences, and have been struggling to maintain a consistent national identity over the 
years. This is represented clearly in North Korea by a large number of articles concerned with 
upholding the Juche values as well as combating ‘imperialism’ but equally so in South Korea 
with concerns over how national identity and especially Korean language, tradition, and ways 
should be protected despite the country’s obvious participation in the global world. Robinson 
told us of the importance of the Korean struggle between the national, and the anti-national 
(Robinson, 1984). Almost thirty years later, the concern over how to protect a Korean national 
identity is a constant in both Koreas, and another important factor to consider in the future.  The 
understanding of one ethnic group that shares a long history has been fuelling efforts of dialogue 
and reconciliation, and has led to the historic family meetings in 2000. Kim had suggested that 
following the initial South and North Korean dialogues of the mid 1980s, North Korea has 
started to drop some of its aggressive rhetoric that had been aimed at the South Korean 
population (1990b). This trend is confirmed when considering how North Korea and South 
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Korea conceives of each other in terms of national identity in Charts 3a and 3b. Eventually, two 
dominant characteristics emerge from the study: first, culture is the most common important 
vehicle to communicate, manage and maintain national identity, second, the common past and 
especially Japanese colonialism as well as China’s imperialist claims over the peninsula is 
central to how both North Korea and South Korea define what has threatened their national 
identity. Both Koreas have also worked jointly to raise awareness to UNESCO of several 
monuments and sites, and have worked jointly as well to ensure that Koguryo burial mounds 
would retained as being first and foremost a Korean site. Eventually, a unique Korean national 
identity appears to be rising from the Korean people having been attacked, colonised and 
divided, regardless of how both states define their civic identities.  
 
Conclusion: Whither Koreas, Present, and Future 
 
 The current analysis represents a first step in trying to understand the nature of a 
contemporary national identity concept in both South Korea and North Korea. As such, the study 
had simple aims which are often difficult to clearly demonstrate: to identify whether the concept 
of national identity is relevant to contemporary Korean peninsula, how do the Koreas define their 
own national identity and how the concept sustained domestically, and identity is how similar or 
different the identities are from one another. In the future, a subsequent part of the project, now 
that the perimeters of Korean national identities have been established, will deal with 
investigating how other countries and systems have managed diverging identities, and trying to 
understand what could be of help in the Korean context.  
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 As it stands, there are a number of important points that need to be made: there is indeed 
a national identity concept in both North and South Korea, and the concept is managed mostly by 
the elite powers in both countries, with each governing structures trying to manage changes that 
come from external, and sometimes internal forces. There is an obvious lack of dialogue on the 
concept of identity, when it comes to both Koreas, however, as most of the interaction that the 
two Koreas have with one another are of a security-oriented nature. This had been established by 
Bleiker more than ten years ago (Bleiker, 2001), and still remains true today, thus making the 
need for a different substantive dialogue between the two Koreas obvious. Another difficulty to 
dialogue and constructive engagement is dealing with North Korea’s apparent abnormality, and 
especially its historical legacy. Because of National Security Laws in place in South Korea, there 
is a real dichotomy when considering the North: indeed, there is a sense of oscillation between 
the will to engage, and the need to be secure. This situation is similar to how many Western 
countries treated Eastern European countries after the fall of Communism, with, in the West, a 
“temptation to view history and memory in Eastern Europe as out of control, with tribal passions 
blood feuds and primitive ethnic strife threatening stability in Europe” (Esbenshade, 1995) The 
same situation is true within North Korea, where the South has often been seen as ‘sleeping with 
the enemy’ because of its partnership with the United States. Can the two Koreas remember to 
forget, when the time comes, however? Perhaps a few missed opportunities were, after all, the 
Seoul 1988 Olympic Games and Soccer World Cup 2002 and the notable absence of North 
Korea from the organising comity. The flag swap mishap at the beginning of the 2012 London 
Olympics that saw the North Korean Womens’ soccer team associated with the South Korean 
flag before their game start is a painful reminder of the inner attachment to one’s citizenship. Is a 
civic concept stronger than ethnic and historic nationalism, however? The remembrance and 
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celebrations of Korea’s most traditional ways appear as a potential key in developing a unified 
national identity. Exciting meetings such as North Korean children performance in Seoul in June 
2000, or the fact that a number of South Korean cinemas have started to establish links with the 
North is of major importance (Bleiker, 2001). Some of those interactions might not always have 
to necessarily be directed by the state, at least in the case of South Korean initiatives, and the 
range of potential connecting points is very large: news articles that focused on culture explored 
historical roots and collection through museums, theatre productions, traditional musical 
instruments as well as a number of initiatives to provide cultural awareness of overseas Korean 
citizens. Such programs could indeed provide a gateway to gently remind one of their roots.  
 
 If both Koreas sees themselves as part of the same ethnic group and as having the 
historical paths, traditions, and roots, then one of the hurdles that must be conquered is the 
depiction of the Koreas as Triandafyllidou’s ‘significant others’, a concept that seems to have 
been lessened over the past few years as less antagonism between the two nations and how they 
portray each other has been noted. Choi talks about how “reconciliation through engagement in a 
protracted conflictual relationship has to successfully win out over the old idea of containment” 
(2010).  One of the factors that can win over containment is a change of politics, both in the 
South and in the North, and that would focus on retaining constructive elements from the past 
while agreeing to forget about conflict. Given the attachement both Koreas have had to restoring 
past wrongs committed by Japan and China, it is unclear how succefull such a mission would be. 
Perhaps the fact that moving past a conflictual history with a ‘significant other’ has happenned 
successfully in other parts of the world is also key in considering the Korean case as potentially 
promising case as well.  
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